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This paper attempts to fill gaps faced by policymakers and practitioners in the evaluation of 
cross-border infrastructure projects. It first defines what constitutes cross-border 
infrastructure projects, and then outlines an analytical framework and criteria to evaluate 
them. The criteria identify additionalities and externalities specific to cross-border 
infrastructure projects that need to be stressed in covering broader and indirect impacts that 
are not usually captured in the analysis of national projects. Then the paper examines to 
what extent the defined criteria are applicable in evaluating recent cross-border 
infrastructure projects. It also reports on emerging impacts patterns evidenced in relevant 
studies. The paper draws lessons and implications for design and implementation of cross-
border infrastructure projects. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Demand for infrastructure development in Asia far exceeds the available funding. Regional 
development institutions including the Asian Development Bank (ADB) extend funds to 
support many cross-border (also termed subregional or multi-country) projects to promote 
socioeconomic development in participating countries. 
At the policy level, there are two major economic justifications for regional cooperation 
between two or more countries: (i) the need to deal with project-related additionalities and 
positive and negative externalities and (ii) the potential to derive economies of scale in 
pursuit of national goals. By pursuing these, all participating countries benefit from regional 
cooperation. However, removing physical and nonphysical barriers in order to realize these 
benefits requires investment as well as harmonization and simplification of relevant policies 
and procedures. 
Regarding the first justification for regional cooperation, cross-border projects may bring 
additional concessional and non-concessional funds. Positive externalities (e.g., benefits 
such as time and cost savings, environmental protection, and trade facilitation) and negative 
externalities (e.g., costs such as environmental pollution, trafficking,  and the spread of 
communicable diseases) arise when the consequences of one or more countries’ actions 
spill over national borders. If the concerned countries do not make cooperative 
arrangements, too few positive externalities and too many negative ones will arise. 
As to the second justification, regional programs and cross-border projects can produce 
economies of scale in provision of public or private (marketable) goods and services above 
and beyond what any country could achieve alone. As such, regional cooperation can 
facilitate the achievement of national goals. 
Regional economic cooperation can also be conceptualized through club  theory.  Any 
collective endeavor (or club) must satisfy two basic conditions: (i) it must be self-sustaining 
and (ii) it must provide enough net benefits for each of its members. The success of a club 
depends on its benefits derived from reduction in unit cost from pooled productive capacities 
exceeding the cost of collective action. The cost is often influenced by physical distance 
between the countries. In the Pacific, for example, adding more remote countries entails 
higher diseconomies of isolation. This tension between scale benefits and distance costs of 
collective action determines the size of an “optimal club” (in this case, a group of countries). 
The composition of the “optimal club” may vary significantly according to the issue or service 
under consideration. 
Reduction in trade costs is among the most important expected outcomes of cross-border 
infrastructure projects. Trade costs are often defined as the range of costs involved in 
moving a product from a point of production to a market. As such, they can refer to both 
national and cross-border transactions. For an analysis of regional cooperation, the focus 
must be on the cross-border aspects of such costs (or “international trade costs”), since 
these raise barriers to trade and restrict the return on investments in export goods (although 
they raise it for import substitutes). Declines in such costs make goods more cost 
competitive and raise the return on investment. 
While the benefits associated with cross-border infrastructure projects and the rationale for 
regional cooperation are well recognized by policymakers and practitioners, evaluation 
practice suffers from analytical difficulties as well as inadequate data because of the elusive 
nature of such data for infrastructure projects whose benefits and costs go beyond national 
boundaries. This paper attempts to fill this gap. 
Section 2 defines cross-border infrastructure projects and provides the framework and 
criteria for evaluating them. Section 3 examines the extent to which such criteria can be 
applied in evaluating recent cross-border infrastructure projects. It also describes emerging ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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impact patterns observed in various relevant studies. Section 4 draws out lessons learned 
and Section 5 provides recommendations for design and implementation of cross-border 
infrastructure projects. 
2.  EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 
2.1  Concept and Definition 
For the purpose of the study on Infrastructure and Regional Cooperation, a “cross-border” 
infrastructure project is defined to be either an infrastructure project with activities spanning 
two or more countries, or a national infrastructure project that has significant cross-border 
impact. Examples of national projects with significant cross-border impacts include transport 
infrastructure (land, sea, and air) projects that create international traffic, power projects 
involving sales of electricity to neighbor countries, and cross-border telecommunications 
networks.
1
In the context of ADB, its Regional Cooperation and Integration Strategy (ADB 2006a) does 
not explicitly define “cross-border infrastructure,” but it articulates its distinguishing feature as 
cross-border externalities that would not be caused by a collection of national projects. The 
strategy also requires that such infrastructure create “additional” net benefits that constitute 
some form of positive spillover effects accruing to all participating countries (i.e., regional 
public goods). That is, the net benefits of cross-border projects would be larger than those 
that would be obtained by national projects alone.
 
2 The current practice of project benefit-
cost analysis is typically limited to quantifying direct impact in the nature of partial equilibrium. 
The analysis of cross-border projects needs to cover broader and indirect impacts in the 
nature of dynamic general equilibrium to the extent reasonable.
3
The larger are these cross-border positive externalities, the stronger is the case for regional 
public goods, and therefore, the stronger is the economic rationale for regional cooperation. 
Another rationale for regional cooperation derives from coordination failure among national 
governments. National governments may not be willing to contribute their share of costs of 
providing regional public goods. This may be because they think that the partner countries 
might not match their contribution. Such a failure to contribute would not necessarily be 
strategic (because neighbor countries are aware that they will interact again in the future), 
but could be due to a combination of resource constraints and institutional weakness. The 
larger is the extent of such coordination failure, the stronger is the economic rationale for 
public intervention (see Appendix 1 for a discussion on regional public goods).
 
4
                                                 
1 ADB operations refer to “subregional” instead of “cross-border” projects. The World Bank defines a subregional 
project more restrictively as having more than two countries involved directly in the project; a two-country 
project is defined as a bilateral cross-border project. The latter case can be considered as having subregional 
impacts on the condition that bilateral borders are part of economic corridors.  The working definition of a 
“subregional”  project  at ADB accommodates any projects that  can be described by  one or more of the 
following: (i) involving  two  or more countries but excluding bilateral projects; (ii) single country project but 
linking subregional transport corridors; and (iii) those included in Regional Cooperation Strategies and 
Programs. 
 The rule of 
2 A clear case of divergence between aggregate net benefits and the sum of national net benefits is evidenced by 
an example in Roy (2000) of the high-speed Paris–Brussels–Cologne–Amsterdam–London rail project. He 
points out that conventional evaluation from the national perspective omitted cross-border benefits accruing to 
non-resident users traveling in each national section and led to underestimation of aggregate net benefits by 
27%. 
3 This issue is not unique to cross-border projects. However, the larger scale of cross-border projects requires, 
for example, the addition of various corridor investments in infrastructure facilities to road investments, and 
correspondingly the inclusion of benefits from these investments in the overall analysis.  
4 In this regard, donors that support regional cooperation are justified in earmarking some portion of their financial 
resources for cross-border projects. ADB has a “set-aside” portion of about 10% in its concessional funds 
(called the Asian Development Fund). ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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the game in regional cooperation is that all participating countries benefit (a win-win result for 
the club). 
2.2  Project Cycle and Evaluation 
In general, project evaluation requires that a consistent framework is applied at all stages of 
the project cycle. The process starts with analytical work that identifies potential investment 
projects. Then a country-level or sector-level program selects the projects to be financed. 
Then each project is formulated by financiers including external donors and executing 
agencies of the client country. After approval by all stakeholders, the project agreement is 
signed and its implementation commenced. A project performance report is prepared by the 
project officers as part of the monitoring of the project’s implementation. After the project’s 
planned activities are completed, the project officers produce a project completion report. 
This provides an opportunity for self-evaluation of the process of implementation, identifies 
success factors and problems encountered, checks all the assumptions made at the 
appraisal stage, recalculates financial and economic rates of return, and reports on 
compliance with social and environment safeguards. It also identifies lessons and follow-up 
actions, where appropriate, to ensure that project benefit streams continue. Further 
monitoring and progress reporting is carried out by executing agencies of the client country. 
After a few years, the project is post-evaluated. This involves rating project performance in 
relation to contribution to development impact using a set of criteria such as relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and likely sustainability of the project outputs and outcomes. 
2.3  Project Design and Monitoring Framework 
At the project design stage, some logically consistent framework is required that can be 
carried through to the later stages of project cycle. Such a framework provides causal links 
between inputs or activities and outputs, and between outputs and outcomes (short- and 
medium-term outcomes and long-term impact). The framework also provides a basis for 
project monitoring and evaluation at the implementation and operation stages. For example, 
benefits to be monitored associated with cross-border project benefits can be related to the 
following categories of gains: 
(i)  Market gains such as domestic market extension and economies of scale (e.g., 
power), connectivity and access to markets (e.g., transport); 
(ii)  Efficiency gains (cost saving) such as reduction in time and vehicle operating 
costs, reduction in physical barriers to trade (e.g., better roads, railways); 
reduction in non-physical barriers to trade (e.g., reduced transaction costs due 
to trade facilitation, harmonized customs, and border formalities); and 
(iii)  Welfare gains such as contribution to trade creation, benefits to all participating 
countries and subregional community, and increased regional and global 
integration. 
2.4  Ex Ante Evaluation 
Projects are pre-evaluated looking at project rationale and strategic links, alternatives, costs 
and  benefits, and risks and uncertainties. For example, ADB’s guidelines for project 
appraisal (ADB 1997) provide project appraisal concepts and step-by-step methods. In 
addition, there are sector-level handbooks for project economic analysis and also a 
methodology note and handbook for economic analysis of subregional projects. 
While economic analysis of national projects is concerned primarily with whether the overall 
net economic benefits are positive and generally helping the poor, the economic analysis of 
cross-border projects goes a step further to analyze how their benefits and costs are ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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distributed across participating countries. As multiple governments must agree on and 
coordinate the institutional and financing arrangements of cross-border projects to ensure all 
stakeholders can anticipate net gains from the project in question, analysis of benefit-cost 
distribution helps to alleviate coordination failure and ensure project sustainability. In 
particular, it is important to identify possible net losers and build in necessary adjustments 
for socioeconomic and environmental externalities. Most obviously, for example, such 
adjustments can include compensatory arrangements for relocated residents and for 
participating governments to ensure operation and maintenance and to address unintended 
negative impacts.  
In principle, project analysis, whether national or cross-border, should care about 
externalities and distributional aspects in order to better inform decision makers and 
stakeholders. ADB’s guidelines (ADB 1997) dedicate one appendix to distribution analysis. 
Adhikari and Weiss (1999a, 2004) extended this framework to cross-border aspects with the 
stakeholder breakdown between participating countries. Therefore, a basic methodology of 
distribution analysis for cross-border projects has been put forward (see Box 1). 
Box 1: Key Steps in Economic Analysis of Cross-Border Projects 
(i)  Identify the market (demand) both within and outside the country and 
subregion; 
(ii)  Establish the project’s financing plan and identify any project-specific additional 
and concessional funds; 
(iii)  For commercial projects, estimate the financial net present value (NPV) (at a 
10% or 12% discount rate) and internal rate of return (IRR) at constant United 
States dollars and show how the income of different groups and countries is 
affected; 
(iv)  Estimate the benefit of project-specific finance as the difference between the 
present value of the inflow of funds and the present value of the outflow under 
the terms specified; 
(v)  For non-commercial projects and for commercial projects with significant side 
effects, quantify and value the external effects (e.g., environmental impacts and 
cost saving/consumer surplus); 
(vi)  Allow for any important market distortions by applying national conversion 
factors to adjust financial values relating to expenditure in a country to 
economic prices; 
(vii)  Where a financial analysis has been carried out, adjust the financial NPV and 
IRR to obtain the corresponding economic NPV and IRR; 
(viii)  For non-commercial projects, compare economic benefits (externalities) 
directly with economic costs to obtain the economic NPV and IRR; 
(ix)  Allocate the economic NPV between participating countries and show the 
gainers and any losers—and consider whether any compensating 
arrangements are required to offset loss to any of the participating countries; 
and 
(x)  Undertake risk and sensitivity analysis. 
 Source: Adhikari and Weiss (1999b). 
As discussed above, a successful cross-border project should offer benefits for all 
participating countries. To determine this, analysts and evaluators need to look at project 
outcomes and impacts, i.e., short-  and long-term benefits, and their distribution at local, 
national, cross-border, subregional and regional (extra-subregional) levels. Complementary 
investments can create additional demand and increase project benefits. For example, ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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economic corridors complement transport corridors and also mitigate costs (e.g., to 
environment and public health). Benefits arise from cost savings, time savings, efficiency 
gains because of the larger scale of operations, and welfare gains because the subregional 
society as a whole benefits. However, estimation needs to be carried out carefully to avoid 
double counting of such benefits as vehicle operating cost (VOC) savings and time savings 
vis-à-vis growth in transport sector activities, better quality roads vis-à-vis road safety (time 
savings of passengers and cargo, savings of lives and injuries), and additional economic 
activities vis-à-vis better access to market (not included in the cost savings). 
Equally important is to identify risks to sustainability of outcomes and impacts. Important 
considerations for this risk identification include operation and maintenance by transit 
countries or locations and revenue generation or special funding for that purpose. Common 
project risks and sustainability factors relate to financial returns and revenue generation of 
the project, sharing of costs among participating countries, technical upkeep (operation and 
maintenance), foreign exchange risk (e.g., in cases of power purchase), and complementary 
investments.  
2.5  Post-Completion Evaluation 
Upon its completion, the project’s performance is evaluated based on relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. Relevance refers to the adequacy of the design 
and the consistency of the project’s impact and outcome with the government’s and donor’s 
development strategies at the time of approval. Effectiveness refers to the extent to which 
the project outcome as designed and approved has been achieved. Efficiency refers to how 
economically resources have been converted to results, typically expressed as the 
economic internal rate of return or cost-effectiveness indicators. Sustainability refers to the 
likelihood that human, institutional, financial, and other resources are sufficient to maintain 
the project outcome over its economic life. 
2.6  Impact Evaluation 
Impact evaluation involves  systematic identification of a given development activity’s 
effects—positive or negative, intended or not—on individual households, institutions, and the 
environment. It helps us to better understand the extent to which activities reach the poor 
and the magnitude of their effects on people’s welfare. Tools for impact evaluations can be 
large-scale sample surveys in which project populations and control groups are compared 
before and after the intervention and possibly at several points during it. Evaluations can 
also be done through small-scale rapid assessment and participatory appraisals where 
estimates of impact are obtained from combining group interviews, key informants, case 
studies, and available secondary data. 
There are two basic approaches to impact evaluation: non-experimental and random 
experimental. The non-experimental approach uses statistical techniques to construct the 
counterfactual outcome. These techniques, though frequently used, are often subject to 
biased results that may lead to incorrect development impacts. Random experimental 
methods are common in the pharmaceutical and other industries but are new to the 
economic development field. In the medical field, random assignment to treatment and 
control groups (also called a “randomized control trial”) is implemented depending on the 
nature of the medical intervention, who the beneficiaries are, or what the benefits are. Thus, 
as in the medical field, the unit of randomization in the economic development field could be 
individuals, groups (e.g., schools, primary health care centers), or geographical areas (e.g., 
villages, cities). The random selection of the treatment (under the project) and control 
(outside the project) groups ensures that in general, these groups are identical at the outset. 
Any difference in the socioeconomic or environmental outcomes between the two groups 
after the project is taken to be attributable to the project. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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Random experimental assignment is considered to be  the most reliable approach to 
measuring net impact of development assistance. As Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2008) 
have pointed out, only properly implemented randomization can solve selection bias 
completely. For example, the PROGRESA program (now called Oportunidades) in Mexico is 
one of the best known examples of a randomized evaluation in developing countries. The 
program was launched in 1998 with a deliberate built-in evaluation design in which half of 
the households in target communities were selected to receive the program, and baseline 
and subsequent data were collected for both treatment and control communities. Actual 
evaluation of the program was contracted to International Food Policy Research Institute and 
the data was shared via their website. The evaluation had a demonstration effect and was 
replicated in many other Latin American countries.  
The nature of randomization requires that the treatment groups (areas) as opposed to 
control groups (areas) be fairly disaggregated, such as at the level of individuals, villages, or 
at most districts. Randomized experiments are therefore more suitable for “targeted” projects 
such as education and health programs than infrastructure projects because the “treatment” 
(or influence) of the latter is by nature diffused geographically. Furthermore, while the main 
purpose of targeted interventions is to deliver direct benefits to the intended beneficiaries, 
much of the benefits of cross-border infrastructure projects are indirect and diffused with 
varying influence over beneficiary groups, making it difficult to design randomization even at 
the project design stage. Nonetheless, a  carefully carried out impact evaluation can be 
useful in many important ways. Box 2 summarizes the scope of usefulness, as well as the 
strengths and drawbacks, of rigorous impact evaluation. 
Box 2: Rigorous Impact Evaluation of Cross-Border Infrastructure Projects 
Scope of usefulness:  
•  Measuring outcomes and impacts of an activity and distinguishing these from 
the influence of other, external factors. 
•  Helping to clarify whether costs for an activity are justified. 
•  Informing decisions on whether to expand, modify, or eliminate projects, 
programs, or policies. 
•  Drawing lessons for improving the design and management of future activities. 
•  Comparing the effectiveness of alternative interventions. 
•  Strengthening accountability for results. 
•  Strengths:  
•  Provides estimates of the magnitude of outcomes and impacts for different 
demographic groups or regions over time. 
•  Provides answers to some of the most central development questions: To what 
extent are we making a difference? What are the results on the ground? How 
can we do better? 
•  Systematic analysis and rigor can give managers and policymakers added 
confidence in decision making. 
•  Drawbacks:  
•  Some approaches are very expensive and time-consuming.  
•  Reduced utility when decision-makers need information quickly. 
•  Difficulties in identifying an appropriate counter-factual. 
Source: Compiled from the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group Website (www.worldbank.org/ieg). ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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Given the special characteristics of cross-border infrastructure projects, their impact 
evaluation must strike an appropriate balance between theoretical rigor and practicality of 
implementation. Most likely, the best option is to apply a quasi difference-in-difference 
approach by comparing “before” (baseline) and “after” (post completion) situations between 
the areas (people) under project influence (e.g., along the designated economic corridor) 
and those located relatively farther away from project influence.
5
Economy-wide general equilibrium modeling such as the use of computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models has the advantage of capturing indirect effects through forward 
and backward linkages within and across economies given the rigorous economic structure 
built in the models. However, it has a high data requirement that may not be normally 
available at disaggregated levels in developing countries. Also, CGE analysis tends to be 
simulation or scenario exercises based on certain assumptions that dictate changes in 
exogenous or policy variables. This type of analysis may be more suitable for macro- and 
sector-level analysis, which is left to other discussion papers in this research project. 
 
2.7  Evaluation Criteria 
With the above framework in mind, we can develop a set of practical evaluation criteria 
specific to cross-border infrastructure projects applicable at various stages of the project 
cycle. These stages are (i) preparation stage (project rationale and inputs); 
(ii) implementation stage (process of deployment of inputs to produce outputs); 
(iii) implementation completion stage (physical outputs and initial outcomes); and (iv) post-
completion stage or operation (ultimate desired outcomes and impacts). A particular focus 
should be on the identification of cross-border externalities—both positive and potentially 
negative. Table 1 presents the kinds of criteria applicable in evaluating cross-border 
infrastructure projects. 
 
                                                 
5 For example, Singh and Mitra (2006), in attempting to assess the poverty impact of GMS regional integration 
initiatives, selected Saravan Province in Lao PDR as a “non-corridor” comparator as opposed to the other 
corridor-influenced provinces. They made a practical compromise by resorting to a diagnostic approach over a 
rigorous statistical treatment of causality in the face of “multiple treatments” ongoing simultaneously in the 
GMS and in the absence of baseline data in most cases. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
 
 
Table 1: Evaluation Criteria at Different Stages of Project Cycle 
Positive   Negative 
Quantitative  Qualitative  Quantitative  Qualitative 
Preparation stage (project rationale and inputs) 
- Additional funding mobilized (public and private) 
- Adequate distribution analysis 
- Fair regulatory and pricing arrangements 
 
- Economic rationale for public  
 intervention (in relation to aggregation 
technology of RPGs) (see Appendix 1)  
- Shared vision and strong commitment 
by participating countries/governments 
- Alignment of national and regional 
development goals 
- Alleviation of coordination failure 
- Enhanced inter-governmental  
dialogue and coordination 
- Cross-border transport agreement/ 
power trade agreement signed 
- Adequate planning of mitigation/ 
compensation arrangements 
- Inadequate funding 
- Inadequate distribution  
analysis 
- Unfair regulatory 
and pricing arrangements 
 
- Increased distrust 
and tension  
- Inadequate planning of 
mitigation/compensation 
arrangements 
Implementation stage (inputs and process) 
- Physical infrastructure built successfully 
- Financiers adhering to their commitment 
- Adequate capacity building support 
- Cross border transport agreement/ 
power trade agreement implemented 
- Adequate implementation of  
mitigation/compensation 
 
- Time delay 
- Cost overrun 
- Shortfall in financiers’  
 delivery 
- Inadequate support 
for capacity building 




Completion stage (physical outputs and initial outcomes) 
- Projected economic benefits are  
being realized or exceeded 
- Adequate revenues or public expenditure for 
 O&M  
Transport sector 
- Reduced cross-border transport cost  
(distance- transport cost diagram) 
- Saved cross-border transit time 
   (distance-lead time diagram)  
- Trained government personnel in 
regional cooperation (learning-by-doing) 
Energy sector 
- Less air pollution (by introducing  
clean coal power plants or diverting  
coal-fired plants to hydropower 
-  Projected economic  
benefits not being  
realized  
- Inadequate revenues  
or public expenditure  
for O&M  
- Inadequate  
compensation for  
displaced/resettled people 
 ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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Positive  Negative 
Quantitative  Qualitative  Quantitative  Qualitative 
Completion stage (physical outputs and initial outcomes)—continued 
- Increased flow of goods/people across border  
towns/cities 
- Lower prices of traded goods in participating 
 economies  
Energy/ICT sectors  
- Lower price in importing countries 
- Higher revenues in exporting countries 
  Transport sector 
- More accidents 
Energy sector 
- Loss of livelihood for local  
people 
 
Post-completion stage or operation (medium-term outcomes and long-term impacts) 
- Growth of border towns/cities 
- Increased income of local residents through  
labor migration 
- Economic agglomeration at the existing “nodes”  
and then dispersion along economic corridors  
subsequently (see Appendix 2 on dynamics 
of agglomeration and dispersion) 
Transport sector 
- Increase in goods/people traffic going beyond 
border cities/towns 
- Increase in tourism revenues 
- Increase in regional and extra-regional trade 
 (including transit trade) 
Energy sector 
- Increase in power and gas trade between 
 contract countries 
- Increase in regional and extra-regional power  
and gas trade 
- Successful coordination in O&M 
- Positive gender impact (better income 
opportunities for women in cross-border 
trading, etc.) 
Transport sector 
- Improved access to public services 
Energy sector 
- Improved regional energy security 
(particularly for power importing 
countries) 
Transport sector  
- Illegal migration and  
unprotected migrant  
workers 
- Increased incidence of  
communicable diseases 
- Increased trafficking of  
vulnerable people 
- Increased drug smuggling 
 
- Failed coordination in 
 O&M 
- Negative gender impact  
(higher exposure of  
women to vulnerable  
situations) 
- Environmental  
degradation  
- Loss of cultural  
diversity 
 
ICT = information and communications technology; O&M = operations and maintenance; RPG = regional public good. 
Note: Stylized for illustrative purpose. The list of project externalities and effects is not exhaustive.   
Source: Authors. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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3.  REVIEW OF CROSS-BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECTS 
The review in this section draws on available documents from inside and outside ADB and 
interviews with ADB officers. The framework and criteria suggested in the previous section 
are applied in the review to the extent possible. 
ADB’s lending to explicitly “subregional” projects came on full stream only after the late 
1990s beginning with the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program, followed by other 
regional cooperation initiatives such as Central Asian Regional Cooperation (CAREC) and 
South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC). As a result, a limited number of 
cross-border infrastructure projects have been completed and can be evaluated ex post. 
Therefore, our review covers both completed and ongoing projects. 
The list of the 26 projects we reviewed is provided in Appendix 3. They were selected from 
the projects either completed or ongoing in the transport, energy, and information and 
communications technology (ICT) sectors that are at least partially financed by ADB. Of the 
projects, 10 have been completed and the other 16 are ongoing. We summarize findings 
from our review of these projects along several key aspects below. (The numbers in 
parentheses indicate serial numbers used in Appendix 3.) 
3.1  Quality at Entry 
3.1.1  Inadequate Presentation of Rationale as a Cross-Border Project 
With a few exceptions (e.g., Establishment of Pacific Aviation Safety Office, Number 26), 
project appraisal documents generally fall short of articulating cross-border externalities and 
rationale for collective action in a multi-country perspective. While the rationale from the 
viewpoint of individual countries is relatively well established, presentation on the rationale 
for regional cooperation and coordination is often weak. Positive cross-border effects to 
neighboring countries seem to be given secondary importance. This would be unfortunate 
for projects where financing requirements are large and an explicitly regional perspective 
could help in mobilizing funds from a wider circle of donors, particularly for transport projects 
for which private sector funds are hard to mobilize. For example, (i) the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) section of the North–South Economic Corridor in GMS 
seems to be the “weakest link” as categorized by the supply characteristics of regional public 
goods (see Appendix 1) and could have been articulated in the project document (Number 
5); (ii) the Cambodian section of the Southern Economic Corridor in GMS seems to be the 
“weaker link” (Number 6) (also see Appendix 1); (iii) the Cambodian section of the 
Singapore–Kunming railway link seems to be the “weakest link” (Number 7); and (iv) the 
Viet Nam section of the Kunming–Haiphong railway link seems to be the “weaker link” 
(Number 8). 
For power projects that are designed to sell electricity from one country to another, the bulk 
of the benefits accruing to both countries can be considered cross-border benefits because 
they would not arise if the power generated could not cross the border and exploit 
economies of scale in a regional perspective. For a selling country, cross-border benefits 
derive from additional sales revenue for the operating entity and additional tax revenues for 
the government. For a purchasing country, cross-border benefits derive from additional 
consumer surplus by receiving lower-cost power compared with alternative energy sources. 
Their cross-border “net” benefits are obtained by subtracting the construction and 
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3.1.2  National Orientation Taking Focus Away from Benefits Distribution 
Out of the 26 projects reviewed, 13 included some form of distribution analysis across 
countries and identification of cross-border benefits separate from national benefits while the 
others did not include distribution analysis nor separate cross-border benefits in their 
economic analysis at the project preparation stage (see Box 3). Of the former group, 8 
projects are loans provided to multiple countries while 12 projects in the latter group are 
loans provided to a single borrower country. While the lack of distribution analysis may be 
partly due to data and resource constraints, it may also be due to political or strategic 
considerations within multilateral donor agencies like ADB in dealing with borrower 
governments. An incentive to carry out distribution analysis might be weak when an 
assistance loan is extended to a single country. However, such a tendency would be 
unfortunate because showing additional cross-border benefits accruing to neighbor countries 
would enhance further cooperation and promote better alignment of national and regional 
development goals. Assessment of whether there are benefits for all participating countries 
is very important for the successful preparation of cross-border projects. 
 
Box 3: Inadequate Distribution Analysis 
•  No account of subregional benefits despite the project’s subregional nature 
(Number 1). 
•  No attempt was made for distribution analysis, but given the nature of the 
project, identification of cross-border benefits and explicit distribution analysis 
would have strengthened the project rationale (Number 3). 
•  Initial analysis of the project did not include distribution analysis due to the 
perceived sensitivity of the inequitable benefit distribution among the three 
affected countries (Number 5). 
•  Subregional benefits associated with the road’s contribution to increased 
integration of the economies of Thailand, Cambodia, and Viet Nam along the 
Southern Economic Corridor were discussed but not quantified due to the 
“long-term” nature of these benefits (Number 6). 
•  Distributional analysis was  done only within the borrowing country even 
though the project title includes “GMS” explicitly. The project was categorized 
as a “single-country, regional project” as the road is located strictly within the 
Lao PDR but it connects with the already existing road on the Thai side 
(Number 10). 
•  Even when a power project is designed to sell electricity from one country to 
another,  the economic analysis often lacks benefit distribution across 
countries (Numbers 12, 13). 
•  When a poverty reduction objective is combined with a regional cooperation 
objective, analysis of benefit distribution  across  countries seems to be 
neglected or receives low priority (Numbers 6, 14). 
•  While the project involves Cambodia’s power purchase from Viet  Nam, 
cross-border benefits to Viet Nam associated with economies of scale and 
additional sales were not quantified (Number 16). 
•  While all net benefits accruing to participating countries can be considered 
cross-border benefits in the ICT  project,  the project document kept the 
distribution analysis as an internal document due to concern over potential 
political sensitivity (Number 25). 
Source: Authors’ compilation. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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3.1.3  Additional Funding Specific to Cross-Border Nature 
Most project documents do not explain adequately about additional funding of a 
concessional nature that may have been provided specifically due to the cross-border nature 
of the project in question.
6
 
 Some donors may have strategic as well as commercial interest 
in supporting certain projects (e.g., Malaysia’s support to the railway project in Cambodia) 
and others including bilateral donors may prefer to allocate a certain portion of their funds to 
cross-border projects. As these funds are considered to be net benefits flowing into the 
participating countries as a whole in the form of net resource transfer, a clearer articulation 
of this aspect is warranted (see Box 4). 
                                                 
6 See the previous footnote. Multilateral development banks like ADB also play the role of an investment catalyst 
or a finance mobilizer as their participation in a project reassures other co-financiers including those in the 
private sector.  
Box 4: Project-Specific Concessional Finance for Cross-Border Projects 
•  The Northern Economic Corridor Project,  initially  presented as a purely domestic 
project, was later presented as a subregional one. This may have helped in mobilizing 
cooperation and additional funds from the Thai and PRC governments. The project 
document could have articulated this financing arrangement more clearly (Number 5). 
•  Funding from OPEC may be specific to the project’s regional nature (Numbers 6, 18). 
•  Funding from OPEC and Malaysia may be specific to the regional nature (Number 7). 
•  Funding from France may be specific to the regional nature (Number 8). 
•  Funding from OPEC, Australia,  and Korea may be specific to the  regional nature 
(Number 10). 
•  Funding from Australia may be specific to the regional nature (Number 11). 
•  Funding from JBIC may be specific to the regional nature (Numbers 13, 16). 
•  Funding from the World Bank and Norway may be specific the regional nature 
(Number 14). 
•  Funding from EBRD and TRACECA are considered specific to the regional nature 
(Number 17). 
•  ADB grant and funding from Korea and the PRC may be specific to the regional nature 
(Number 20). 
•  Funding from IsDB and Saudi Arabia may be specific to the regional nature 
(Number 21). 
•  Grant specific to regional project was provided by USAID in the amount of US$0.5 
million. In addition, funding from OPEC and EBRD may be specific to the regional 
nature (Number 23). 
•  Funding from OFID and IsDB may be specific to the regional nature (Number 24). 
•  Funds from New Zealand, ICAO, and APEC were due to the regional nature 
(Number 26). 
APEC = Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation; EBRD = European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 
ICAO = International Civil Aviation Organization; IsDB = Islamic Development Bank; JBIC = Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation; OFID = OPEC Fund for International Development; OPEC = Organization for 
Petroleum Exporting Countries; TRACECA = Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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3.2   Monitoring and Evaluation of Project Implementation 
3.2.1  Inadequate Compensation for Displaced and Resettled People 
Although the issue of displacement and resettlement is a concern not only for cross-border 
projects but also for national projects, it has a potential of being on a larger scale in the case 
of the former. Some external studies have reported cases in which adequate compensation 
was not being made. For example, a nongovernmental organization in Cambodia reported 
that during the implementation of the Phnom Penh–Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) Highway 
Project, there was no compensation on land or inadequate compensation was given to 
affected families along the project road in Prey Veng Province (Thi 2008). The improvement 
of National Roads 5 and 6, part of which was under the Cambodia Road Improvement 
Project, involved relocation of around 2,100 households with more than 3,400 people. 
Household interviews and focus group discussions in Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap 
provinces revealed that most of the affected people owned some form of cottage stores 
along the roads and felt that the monetary compensation provided was not adequate to 
reopen their businesses in new sites. Also, they had not been informed about the 
compensation rate (Ritty 2008). 
3.2.2  Incomplete Connectivity Penalizing Outcome 
When road construction along an expected transport corridor is left incomplete, the outcome 
is penalized to the extent of such incompleteness. For example, although it was observed 
that since completion of the Champasak Road Improvement Project, the number of trucks 
going from southern Lao PDR toward the Cambodian border increased sixfold, very few 
trucks actually cross the border due to the absence of the final 6.9-kilometer link road. 
Therefore, trading of goods by river from the border jetty is more common for now. This 
happened because there was a conflict between Lao PDR and Cambodia as to the location 
of the border demarcation. This is a case in which an incomplete border link prevents full 
realization of expected cross-border benefits. The PRC government has expressed its 
support to complete the missing part of the road. 
There is also a case in which a time lag between different donor assistance projects has 
created a temporary missing link in a transport corridor. For example, the Phnom Penh–
HCMC route is currently incomplete with the remaining bottleneck being the upgrading of the 
Phnom Penh–Neak Leoung section (61 kilometers) and construction of the bridge over the 
Mekong River (under construction with Japanese aid and expected to be completed by 
2010). There is heavy traffic from HCMC westward toward the Cambodian border and many 
industrial estates along the road are developing outward from HCMC. However, noticeable 
cross-border industrial linkages do not appear to have developed between the Phnom Penh 
and HCMC economies. Obvious economic integration so far seems concentrated at the Moc 
Bai–Bavet border areas (Fujimura 2008). 
3.3  Impact Monitoring During Operation 
Capacity and resource constraints tend to be a persistent issue in impact monitoring starting 
with the baseline survey and benchmarking. The area of environmental impact tends to be 
most affected by these constraints. For example, during the implementation of the Theun-
Hinboun Hydropower Project, the Theun-Hinboun Power Company (THPC) established the 
Environmental Management Committee Office comprising local staff to manage mitigation 
and compensation issues. However, its staff capacity was low and received inadequate 
supervision from the international specialists. As a result, THPC had to deal with impacts as 
they occurred, rather than in a strategically planned manner. This became a serious issue 
from the start of project operation. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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3.4  Analytical Rigor in Project Evaluation 
The quality of project evaluation in different stages of the project cycle depends critically on 
the initial analytical rigor in project preparation. In the case of cross-border projects, a crucial 
part of the analysis is the identification and quantification of cross-border benefits. Most of 
the project documents reviewed in the transport sector did not adequately analyze cross-
border benefits beyond national benefits, although good attempts were made in some 
projects. Table 2 summarizes the review on this aspect. 
Table 2: Analysis of Cross-Border Benefits in Transport Projects 
Project  Comment 
Champasak Road 
Improvement 
Broader impacts on trade and tourism were discussed but not 
quantified. 
Phnom Penh to Ho 
Chi Minh City 
Highway 
Improvement  
The EIRR for the overall project is 26% when “subregion benefits” 
are considered and 23% when they are not. Cross-border benefits 
are based only on projected traffic diverted from other transport 
modes and do not consider wider external impacts through trade 
and investment. 
Southern Yunnan 
Road Development  
Traffic projection accounts for an increase in cross-border traffic 
from 2005 onward after completion of the Northern Economic 
Corridor Project, the connecting road from the project road. 
However, estimation of cross-border benefits did not account for 
this. 
East–West Corridor   Cross-border traffic formed the basis for subregional benefits in the 
calculation of EIRR. Overall, EIRR was estimated to be 19% 
without and 23% with subregional benefits. While this is the first 
clear case of explicitly presenting cross-border benefits above the 
sum of national benefits, the analysis did not go further in capturing 
wider benefits associated with increased trade flows, which were 
discussed but not integrated into economic calculation. 
Northern Economic 
Corridor 
Two types of distribution analyses were done: that between 
countries and that within Lao PDR by different functional groups. 
However, additional cross-border external benefits beyond the sum 
of national net benefits were not identified. Also, wider impacts 
through changes in trade, investment, and tourist flows were not 
captured. 
Rehabilitation of the 
Railway in 
Cambodia  
Distribution of project benefits was discussed qualitatively but not 




Yen Vien–Lao Cai 
Railway Upgrading  
Subregional benefits associated with increased trade and reduced 
transport costs to coastal ports were discussed but not quantified. 
Kunming–Haiphong 
Transport Corridor: 
Noi Bai–Lao Cai 
Highway 
Subregional benefits associated with reduced travel time between 
Kunming and Haiphong, alleviation of traffic congestion in cities and 
towns, and generation of employment opportunities were discussed 




Traffic forecasts were made partly based on analysis of regional 




Distribution analysis was done for each country component 
(Cambodia and Viet Nam) and for the project road as a whole, but 
did not distinguish cross-border benefits that national road projects 
would not have separately obtained, despite reference to ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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“enormous potential” to facilitate movement of goods and people 




Subregional benefits were not calculated due to lack of origin and 





International generated traffic was separately treated in EIRR 





Interesting attempt made on distribution analysis based on 
expected increase in four types of trade flows: Tajikistan–Kyrgyz 




The appraisal analyzed domestic and international trade flows, 
associated benefits due to the project, and their distribution among 
Mongolia, PRC, and Russia. However, “additional” cross-border 
benefits beyond the sum of national benefits were not separated. 
Project  Comment 
East–West Highway 
Improvement 
Cross-border benefits were not identified or quantified despite the 




“International traffic” based on generated and diverted traffic was 
distinguished in quantifying cross-border benefits, but it is unclear 
how wider impacts on trade and investments are related to this 
traffic.  
CAREC = Central Asian Regional Cooperation; EIRR = estimated economic rate of return; GMS = Greater Mekong 
Subregion; Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic; PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
It should be noted, however, that some road projects do not have adequate clues with which 
to benchmark cross-border traffic. For example, in the case of  the Northern Economic 
Corridor Project, the project road was impassable for several months of a year and traffic 
projection had to be based on the traffic in the areas where the existing traffic was 
considered proximate to how the traffic might be generated after project completion. 
Similarly, in the case of the GMS Southern Coastal Corridor Project, the Viet Nam–
Cambodia border was closed to international traffic prior to the project, making quantitative 
benchmarking for cross-border traffic impossible. Practitioners face a practical problem of 
weighing the accounting of benefits to demonstrate economic viability, e.g., beyond certain 
cutoff criteria of economic rate of return, against the corresponding cost of collecting 
additional data and information. As a result, benefit quantification tends toward conservative 
estimates.  
3.5  Patterns of Emerging Outcomes and Impacts: Macro- and 
Micro-Level Evidence 
Mindful of the numerous pitfalls and subtleties listed above, many studies, albeit less than 
the ideal of randomized evaluation, have produced interesting results indicating emerging 
outcomes and impacts of cross-border infrastructure projects implemented in Asia. At the 
macro level, cross-border infrastructure reduces trade costs, leading to more trade and 
investment, and then to growth. At the micro level, cross-border infrastructure can benefit the 
poor by improving their income opportunities and access to labor markets and social 
services. Here, we summarize notable findings based on the review of available project 
documents and studies undertaken by ADB and others. They are mainly related to cross-
border infrastructure projects in the transport sector. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
 
  18 
3.5.1   Macro-Level Evidence  
Two types of approaches have been used in analyzing the macro impact of regional 
infrastructure development: econometric analysis using panel data and simulation analysis 
using CGE models. While these studies have limitations in isolating the impacts of individual 
projects, they offer insights on the aggregate-level impact of infrastructure development. For 
example, Edmonds and Fujimura (2008) used a gravity model using panel data from GMS 
countries to analyze the determinants of regional trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows. The study found that cross-border road development (expressed in road density) has 
had a distinctively positive impact on regional trade flow, controlling for other factors. Menon 
and Warr (2008) constructed a multi-sector, multi-household general equilibrium model to 
quantify the effect of rural road improvement on poverty incidence in the Lao PDR. They 
found different impacts depending on the type of road improvement. For example, upgrading 
of no-access roads to dry-season-access roads has a far larger impact on household 
poverty compared with upgrading dry-season-only roads to all-weather roads. This implies 
that given the Lao PDR’s landlocked location, improving rural road networks, which would 
practically connect to either one of its neighbor countries (e.g., Champasak Road 
Improvement Project), can significantly enhance the welfare of poor households.  
In a forward-looking study of the CAREC region, ADB (2006c) used a multi-sector CGE 
model to simulate the economic impact of regional cooperation in transport, transit, and 
trade policy, focusing on the Kyrgyz Republic. Its results indicate that the cumulative 
increase in the country’s real gross domestic product in 2006–2015 would be far higher than 
the baseline scenario without regional cooperation and that the average cumulative increase 
in the incomes of poor households could be almost doubled over the same period. 
3.5.2   Micro-Level Evidence 
Micro-level studies use primary and secondary data collected from qualitative and 
quantitative surveys (e.g., baseline and post-implementation surveys) and related 
methodologies such as rapid pilot assessments, case studies, and participatory 
assessments. Findings from these studies are summarized here in the order of short- to 
medium- and long-run impacts, and from positive to negative impacts, that are observed at 
the micro level.  
Reduced Travel Time and Transport Cost  
An immediate outcome of building cross-border transport infrastructure is reduction in travel 
time and transport cost. In the case of the Champasak Road Improvement Project, travel 
time from the Thai–Lao PDR border at Vung Tau to the Lao PDR–Cambodia border of Veun 
Kham via Pakse was reduced by more than half, and travel costs fell for those using private 
transport. Also, the cost of public transport decreased by more than 20% in real terms (ADB 
2008). In the case of the Phnom Penh–HCMC Highway Project, the average time required to 
reach local health care services has fallen by about 30%, while travel times to schools and 
markets are down by about 40% (Phyrum, Sothy, and Horn 2007). In the case of the East–
West Corridor Project, travel time from the Lao PDR–Viet Nam border of Dansavanh to 
Khanthabouly on Road 9 was reduced from about 12 hours in 2001 to 2.5–3.0 hours 
(Rattanatay 2007). In the case of the North–South Economic Corridor via the Lao PDR, after 
the  completion of the Lao PDR road section, travel time from Bangkok to Kunming was 
reduced from 78 hours in 2000 to 51 hours in 2006, and is projected to be further reduced to 
30 hours in 2015. Correspondingly, the cost of transporting one ton of rubber products from 
Bangkok to Kunming was reduced from US$563 in 2000 to US$392 in 2006, and is 
projected to be further reduced to US$210 in 2015 (Banomyong 2007). In the case of the 
Almaty–Bishkek Regional Road Rehabilitation Project, travel time was reduced by at least 
50% from 5–6 to 2–3 hours (ADB 2008). Transport costs for exporting fruits and vegetables 
from Bishkek to Novosibirsk decreased from US$3,700–3,900 in 2001 to US$3,500–3,700 in 
2004 (Ganiev 2005). ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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Increased Traffic 
Reduced transport costs generate increased traffic. After the completion of the Champasak 
Road Improvement Project, traffic volume on the project route grew at an average annual 
rate of 22% against the projected growth rate of 5.0–7.5% (post evaluation in 2005). The 
number of passenger buses on Road 9 in the Lao PDR along the East–West Economic 
Corridor increased from about 600 buses in 2000 to around 1,560 buses in 2005, while the 
number of freight operators also doubled over the same period (Rattanatay 2007). Traffic 
volume on the route of the Almaty–Bishkek Regional Road Rehabilitation Project grew by 
25% after 2007 (ADB 2008). 
Expanded Trade 
Increased traffic is explained by the expansion of regional trade due to the reduced transport 
costs, particularly over land in the case of road projects. For example, trade between 
Cambodia and southern Viet Nam along the Southern Economic Corridor increased by 
about 40% per year between 2003 and 2006 (ADB 2008). For Savannakhet Province as a 
whole, which is Lao PDR’s transit province along the East–West Economic Corridor, the 
amount of exports and imports increased by 24 times and 39 times, respectively, in 2001–
2005 (Rattanatay 2007). Exports from the Kyrgyz Republic to Kazakhstan increased by 
160% between 1998 and 2007, presumably due in part to the completion of the Almaty–
Bishkek Regional Road Rehabilitation Project (ADB 2008). 
Induced Investments 
Improved cross-border transport infrastructure induces investments for new economic 
activities. In anticipation of a closer economic link between Viet Nam and Cambodia, 
industrial districts on the Viet Nam side along the Southern Economic Corridor are 
developing, such as the Trang Bang Industrial Park, which is generating many jobs for the 
local population  (ADB 2008). In a field survey on the corridor, 70% of the respondents 
showed an interest in owning a small business or expanding their current one in the post-
development period, 12% showed an interest in expanding their agricultural activities, and 
9% expected to work in a factory job if available (Phyrum et al. 2007). FDI is attracted to 
places where transport costs are low and resource complementarity is high. The value of 
FDI and joint ventures in Savannakhet Province increased from only US$96 million in 1995–
2000 to US$250 million in 2001–2005. Of these FDI projects, 53% are in agriculture, and 
villagers in the province have been engaged increasingly in activities sponsored by these 
projects such as silk and cotton production, weaving, and handicrafts (Rattanatay 2007). 
Enhanced Tourism 
Part of the increased traffic volume is related to the increased number of visitors and tourists. 
There was a 128% increase in the number of tourists visiting Champasak Province of the 
Lao PDR between 1998 and 2004 partly due to the Champasak Road Improvement Project 
(post evaluation in 2005). The number of visitors including tourists crossing the Cambodia–
Viet Nam border at Bavet–Moc Bai, rose at an average annual rate of about 53%, and 
vehicles crossing the border increased at an average annual rate of 38% between 2003 and 
2006 (ADB 2008). In Savannakhet Province, the number of tourist arrivals increased from 
90,910 in 1999 to 222,063 in 2006. Following the opening of the Second Mekong 
International Bridge, the number of tourist arrivals increased by 8% in the first two months of 
2007. More than half of such tourism involves regional tours covering Thailand, Lao PDR, 
and Viet Nam (Rattanatay 2007). Tourists visiting Kyrgyz Republic increased by 50% to 
about one million between 2005 and 2007, partly due to the Almaty–Bishkek road 
improvement and its associated border facility improvement, and partly due to the 
complementary private sector investments in accommodation and services  at key tourist 
destinations in the country. A similar development is likely to happen along the Southern 
Economic Corridor because the route passes through all of Cambodia’s designated tourism 
zones (Angkor, Phnom Penh, and coastal zones). ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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Enhanced Movement of People and Income Opportunities 
Enhanced movement of people leads not only to increased short-run tourism but also to 
increased long-run labor mobility. For example, magnitudes of labor movement in GMS have 
been significant. Even Saravan Province in the Lao PDR, which is off the direct East–West 
Corridor route, has sent significant numbers of cross-border workers to Cambodia and 
Thailand—implying a far reaching impact of wage-differential incentives. Enhanced labor 
mobility improves household income opportunities. Overall, the situation for cross-border 
workers in GMS seems to have improved over 2001–2005 as their perceived changes were 
largely for the better in terms of working conditions, ease of crossing the border, and wage 
level (Singh and Mitra 2006). 
Increased Income and Improved Living Standards of Households 
Evidence is emerging on increased income and improved living standards of households 
under the influence of cross-border transport infrastructure projects. About 46% of 
households in the influence area of the Champasak Road Improvement Project increased 
their agricultural output for sale at local markets  and  increased  their incomes  (post 
evaluation in 2005). Of the respondents to the survey on the Southern Economic Corridor, 
70% claimed their living standards had improved while 23% said there had been no changes 
and 7% complained of being worse off, amounting to a generally favorable perception of the 
developmental impact (Phyrum et al. 2007). Between 1994 and 2000, gross domestic 
product in the six municipalities and counties in the influence area of the Southern Yunnan 
Road Development Project increased by 1.9 times on average, significantly higher than the 
national average of 1.4 times. During the same period, US$390 million was paid to the 
workers as wages. The number of tourists in the project area also rose fivefold, leading to 
significant spillover effects (ADB 2008). These are considered to be the initial impacts of 
various investments along the North–South Economic Corridor on the Yunnan side. The 
majority of people living in districts along the East–West Economic Corridor, who previously 
depended on subsistence farming and shifting cultivation, are now engaged in 
commercialized agricultural production of such products as livestock, poultry, sugarcane, 
cassava, bananas, watermelon, and tree plantations for domestic and international markets. 
As the East–West Corridor Project included rural access road components, its benefits also 
reached households located far off Road 9, contributing to wider poverty reduction 
(Rattanatay 2007). 
Growth in Border Cities and Towns: Agglomeration Effects 
As movement of goods and people across borders becomes easier, the diversity of resource 
endowments among neighboring countries tends to magnify agglomeration effects in which 
entrepreneurs exploit new arbitrage opportunities and combine resources with varying 
competitive advantage across borders. While it is still too early to detect the extent of 
agglomeration effects attributable to specific projects, one can safely associate noticeable 
developments at border areas at least partly with the progress in cross-border infrastructure, 
in terms of both physical infrastructure and accompanying institutions and regulatory 
arrangements. For example, the garment industry at Poipet border areas is likely to further 
flourish due to easier movement of goods and people: “In its most basic form, the process 
begins with Thai wholesalers selling Thai fabric to traders in the large Rong Kleung market. 
These traders then subcontract or outsource the production to Cambodian manufacturers 
living in the Poipet area, these manufacturers or subcontractors are usually households with 
tailoring equipment and employing 10–40 garment workers…” (Singh and Mitra 2006: 95). A 
similar development has been observed at the Thailand–Myanmar border at the western end 
of the East–West Corridor. Labor-intensive industries are becoming concentrated in Mae Sot 
District of Tak Province, where Thai garment firms employ labor from Myanmar on a large 
scale (Kudo 2007). Also in other border areas in the GMS such as Bavet (Cambodia)–Moc 
Bai (Viet Nam) and Mae Sai (Thailand)–Tachilek (Myanmar), initial agglomeration effects are 
observable. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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Dispersion along Economic Corridors to Some Extent 
In some economic corridors, dispersion of economic activities from existing nodes seems to 
be emerging. For example, district towns along Road 9 in the Lao PDR are growing fast 
where new concrete houses, markets, guesthouses and restaurants, trade and service 
activities such as petrol stations, automobile repair shops, and other micro enterprises never 
observed before in these remote areas have been mushrooming (Rattanatay 2007). The 
East–West Economic Corridor is starting to see some dispersion effects along Road 9 after 
the initial agglomeration effects at the border nodes such as the Mukdahan (Thailand)–
Savannakhet (Lao PDR) and Dansavanh (Lao PDR)–Lao Bao (Viet Nam) borders. When 
complementary institutions and regulatory aspects of cross-border goods movement improve, 
the dispersion of cross-border benefits will accelerate. (See Appendix 2 on the dynamics of 
agglomeration and dispersion.) 
Dispersion Effects Depend on Complementary Investments 
While cross-border benefits are expected to spread over time, the speed of such diffusion 
and its perception by households depends on complementary investments off the trunk 
routes of transport corridors. For example, 45% of the survey respondents from the Southern 
Economic Corridor believed that in addition to developing the main corridor, rural 
infrastructure as well as basic education and health care should be addressed in order to 
improve rural livelihoods. Responses included rural roads and electricity (88%), factories 
(74%), irrigation (45%), and health and education infrastructure (37%) (Phyrum et al. 2007). 
Road Accidents 
One initially observable negative outcome of cross-border transport infrastructure is an 
increase in accidents. Increased speed and easier border crossing can cause more frequent 
and more severe accidents. Along Road 8 in the Lao PDR, there were around 5,000 
accidents with more than 7,300 injuries and around 500 deaths in 2005. Along Road 9 in 
Savannakhet Province, there were around 1,000 accidents and 2,000 injured with almost 
100 deaths in the same year (Rattanatay 2007). 
Casino Prevalence 
Initial agglomeration effects at border areas, ironically, often begin with quick-cash 
businesses such as casinos, which typically locate at the side of the border where law 
enforcement is weaker, e.g., the Mong Cai (Viet Nam) side of the Viet Nam–Guangxi border; 
the Poipet (Cambodia) side of the Thailand–Cambodia border; the Bavet (Cambodia) side of 
the Viet Nam–Cambodia border; the Tachilek (Myanmar) side of the Thai–Myanmar border; 
the Maila (Myanmar) side of the Yunnan–Myanmar border; and the Boten (Lao PDR) side of 
the Lao PDR–Yunnan border. At Mong Cai, an investor based in Hong Kong, China opened 
a casino hotel in 2002 to serve tourists from the PRC. At Poipet, nine casino hotels were 
operating by 2006 to serve Thai tourists. At Bavet, five or six casino hotels opened by 2006 
to serve Vietnamese tourists. At Boten, a PRC company has recently been given a 30-year 
right to build and operate the Boten Economic Development Zone in which reportedly the 
main draw so far is a casino, which is to serve tourists from the PRC and is off limits to 
Laotians. 
While these casino businesses in border areas have some positive effects in terms of cash 
revenue to the host partners (private and public sector) and employment creation effects for 
local residents (in unskilled jobs presumably), unfavorable social spillover effects including 
those described below can be expected not only for the host country but also for the tourist-
sending country. In fact, at Maila (Myanmar), where the Shan State allowed PRC investors 
to establish casino hotels in the 1990s, crowds of tourists from the PRC flowed into the 
previously quiet town and concern raised by the PRC authorities over the reckless behavior 
of the PRC visitors and their increasing debt led to the closure of the casino hotels by 2005 
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  22 
Smuggling 
Poor people are often used as intermediary porters in smuggling networks. In just two 
examples, poor border villagers are paid to drive smuggled motor bikes and cars across rice 
fields and forest trails along the Cambodia–Thai border; and poor Cambodian women and 
children living in border areas are paid to wear as many Thai clothes as possible and walk 
across the border along informal gates. They are exposed to a considerable risk (especially 
so for women) because, if caught, they are often abused verbally and sometimes physically. 
In the case of drug smuggling, the carriers tend to be poor and vulnerable groups living in 
the corridor provinces, such as street children in Poipet. They take the highest risk in 
becoming porters and peddlers in drug smuggling for small sums of money. Young migrant 
workers are vulnerable to drug abuse because often their employers force them to take 
amphetamines for “strength” so that they can work longer hours (Singh and Mitra 2006). In 
the CAREC region, drug smuggling is a serious issue, especially along the road corridors 
involving Afghanistan. 
HIV/AIDS  
Among the most serious forms of negative cross-border externalities is the spread of 
communicable diseases, especially HIV/AIDS. The number of HIV carriers in Tay Ninh 
Province in Viet Nam reached 1,316 by October 2005 with a marked increase during recent 
years. Among Vietnamese commercial sex workers in Svay Rieng, as many as 40% are 
considered HIV carriers. Out of 1,400 HIV-infected people in Lao PDR in 2001, 872 were 
found in Savannakhet and Saravan provinces alone. Most of these cases are found along 
the Thai border and along Road 9 (Singh and Mitra 2006). Most of outbreaks of HIV/AIDS 
and sexually transmitted diseases are found in the integrated areas along the Thai–Lao PDR 
border, such as Roads 9 and 13 (Thi 2008). 
Human Trafficking 
Human and drug trafficking was the most-cited concern among the survey respondents from 
the Southern Economic Corridor (68% response rate) (Phyrum et al. 2007). There are three 
broad degrees of trafficking: (i) cheating cross-border workers into low standard jobs; (ii) 
cheating children and vulnerable groups into doing risky and demanding tasks such as 
smuggling, begging, and drug peddling; and (iii) trafficking for prostitution or sex work. All 
three forms of trafficking are commonplace along the GMS corridor provinces and are more 
concentrated in areas near the border as there is more labor migration from there. Even 
when authorities know who traffickers are in their jurisdiction, they lack the evidence to bring 
them to court. Witnesses are difficult to find and victims are afraid of coming forward for fear 
of being looked down on by their fellow villagers (Singh and Mitra 2006). 
Illegal Logging and Deforestation 
Opening of regional transport corridors can lead to more illegal logging and deforestation. 
Migration from outlying villages to areas adjacent to the project road in the Champasak Road 
Improvement Project is resulting in clearing of forest buffer zones using slash-and-burn 
techniques. Migrants tend to clear the forest area to build their houses and to create paddy 
fields. This forest encroachment issue needs to be better understood before a 
comprehensive solution can be found (post evaluation in 2005). Given that the bulk of wood 
processing industries in the Lao PDR are concentrated in the central region and particularly 
in the provinces along the East–West Economic Corridor, it is likely that the easier transport 
stimulates more illegal logging (Singh and Mitra 2006). It was reported that landslides and 
deforestation increased in Xishuangbanna in Yunnan Province along National Road 3 of the 
North–South Economic Corridor. Forest cover decreased in the buffer zones of the road 
while rubber plantations increased dramatically along the road, causing concerns about 
environmental degradation. Similar development has been observed on the Lao PDR side of 
the North–South Economic Corridor: cutting of forest trees on both sides of the road to be 
replaced by monoculture crop production such as rubber and coconut plantations (Thi 2008). ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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However, it can be argued that the extent of illegal logging depends on the initial quality of 
the road and the change in the quality due to the project. For example, if a project is 
upgrading from gravel to sealed road, it would not make a difference in the extent of logging 
or smuggling. If the existing quality of the road already enables the transport of illegal logs, 
further improved road quality would not have an incremental negative impact. 
4.  LESSONS LEARNED 
Based on the review and evidence collected above, this section draws lessons and 
implications for the design and implementation of cross-border infrastructure projects.  
4.1  Characteristics of Successful Projects 
We can detect several factors that contribute to successful preparation and implementation 
of cross-border infrastructure projects.  
4.1.1  Clear Rationale in Articulation of Economic Corridor Concept 
For the East–West Corridor Project in the GMS, ADB’s approach was to pursue a broader 
set of cross-border trade and investment impacts including the promotion of special 
production and trade zones that will support the concept of economic corridors. The project 
rationale was based on long-run cross-border benefits along the line of agglomeration and 
dispersion, making clear the economic rationale of the project from a regional perspective. 
Similarly, project documents for road projects in CAREC countries (Numbers 17, 19, 20, and 
22 in Appendix 3) have been relatively well articulated regarding the nature of cross-border 
impacts. This may be partly owing to the fact that these countries are all landlocked and it is 
relatively easy to put road sections in these countries in a larger picture of regional and inter-
regional corridors. As the CAREC transport sector master plan identifies six economic 
corridors across member countries, road projects included in these corridors would all be 
considered cross-border road projects. 
4.1.2  Use of Distribution Analysis as a Guide for a Win-Win Design 
A properly prepared distribution analysis can help adjust project design for a win-win 
direction. For example, the appraisal analysis for the Northern Economic Corridor Project 
indicated a disproportionate share of the benefits from saved vehicle operating costs in favor 
of Thailand and the PRC and against the Lao PDR. Particularly the benefits associated with 
diverted traffic were  projected to accrue to Thai and PRC stakeholders. However,  two 
implicit compensation mechanisms assumed in the project arrangement make up for the 
otherwise unfavorable distributional outcome for the Lao PDR. The first is the transit fee to 
be collected by the Lao PDR government from the road users including those originating 
from Thailand and the PRC. The second is the concessional loans (net financial transfer due 
to the favorable terms of the government loans compared to commercial loans) provided by 
the Thai and PRC governments to the Lao PDR government. These arrangements counter 
project costs disproportionately borne by the Lao PDR government and potential social and 
environmental effects that would mainly accrue to people in the Lao PDR. Given that they 
help ensure a win-win outcome, the project document could have elaborated more on these 
compensating arrangements in project design. 
4.1.3  Fair Chance of Success in Public–Private Partnership in the Energy Sector 
In the energy sector, where potential private demand and supply can meet across borders, 
there is a fair chance of forming a “club” without having to mobilize extensive resources from 
the public sector. Cross-border power projects can capture economies of scale and be 
attractive to international private sector investors. Exportability means bankability for private ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
 
  24 
sector financiers. For example, the Theun-Hinbon Hydropower Project can serve as a model 
for a successful public–private partnership. It has achieved its intended purpose and is 
currently the largest foreign exchange source for the Lao PDR. Sales revenues for the 
Theun-Hinbon Power Company (THPC) increased from US$42 million in 1998 to US$57 
million in 2005 and are expected to maintain that level in the future. THPC’s dividend 
payments in 2003–2005 amounted to US$78 million, of which US$47 million went to 
Electricite du Laos. In 2004, THPC started to pay taxes at about US$3 million a year. The 
project is rated highly relevant, highly efficacious, highly efficient, and likely to be sustainable 
(ADB 2006b). 
4.1.4  Some Aspects of Transport Infrastructure Can Bypass Various Constraints 
Even where diseconomies of scale prevail, as in the case of the Pacific countries, some 
types of transport infrastructure services can be provided collectively. The fee-based 
professional services by the Pacific Aviation Safety Office can be considered a club good. 
An appropriate model of governance is easier to achieve when there are no incumbent 
providers to oppose reform. The Pacific Aviation Safety Office is the first example of a 
regional organization that Pacific developing member countries have been willing to set up 
on a self-financing basis without donor grants. It is likely to serve as a model for future 
intergovernmental regional cooperation, particularly in transport and regulation infrastructure 
and services (Guild 2008). 
ICT Sector Has a Chance of Successful Cross-Border Coordination if Not Finance  
The ICT sector is primarily private sector-oriented and the services involved are close to 
pure private goods. Therefore, public intervention is not much required. However, regional 
context may necessitate coordination by a regional public agency like ADB. The SASEC 
Information Highway Project is a case in point. Several favorable conditions helped the 
successful formulation of the project: (i) ICT is a new sector for cooperation and did not 
involve as much political economy as in the energy and transport sectors; (ii) ICT does not 
involve visible movement of people and goods, so it poses little perceived threat and anxiety; 
and (iii) the physical network had been laid and the project is simply to connect the national 
network across borders. With this first concrete cross-border infrastructure project in place 
and learning effects in cooperation, the SASEC program may advance further in the future. 
Institutional Learning-by-Doing in Regional Cooperation 
Preparation of cross-border infrastructure projects with multilateral facilitation can have 
positive institutional learning effects. For example, in the process of preparing road projects 
associated with the North–South Economic Corridor, multilateral cooperation promoted a 
cooperative relationship between the PRC (particularly Yunnan and Guangxi) and the 
neighboring countries. The second GMS Summit held in Kunming in July 2005 was 
preceded by several senior officials’ meetings and symposiums. This not only helped in 
keeping the commitment to regional cooperation among governments but also has been 
effective in attracting international attention and support (Cao 2008). Learning-by-doing in 
coordination between central and provincial authorities should also  be highlighted. The 
Northern Economic Corridor Project, for example, provided the venue for better coordination 
between Yunnan Province and Beijing, Chiang Rai Province and Bangkok, and Bokeo and 
Luangnamtha provinces and Vientiane. As the project preparation progressed, according to 
ADB staff, provincial authorities took  proactive roles over the central authorities and 
enhanced local ownership of the project. 
4.2  Ensuring Quality at Entry 
It is important to ensure project quality at the entry point of the project cycle. In this case, this 
means ensuring quality specific to cross-border projects at the project preparation stage, as 
it will be carried through to the subsequent stages of the project cycle. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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4.2.1  Ambiguity over Project Objective Leading to Inadequate Analysis 
When poverty reduction is emphasized as an overarching objective, it often appears to 
overshadow the regional or subregional nature of projects. In such cases, analysis of net 
benefit distribution is often neglected or given low priority (see Box 1 above). More 
consistency is required. 
4.2.2  Need for Clearer Account of Cross-Border Externalities and Improved 
Distribution Analysis 
For road projects that are critical parts of economic corridors, projection of generated 
international traffic should be translated into “additional cross-border benefits” even under 
the conventional VOC and time savings framework. For those that form transit routes in 
economic corridors, generated transit traffic and trade are presumably additional cross-
border benefits that would not occur with national roads alone. For example, in the case of 
the Northern Economic Corridor Project in the Lao PDR, transit traffic between Thailand and 
Yunnan that is forecast to be newly generated is clearly part of the cross-border impacts 
national road investments would not have achieved alone. Even for roads that are not in 
transit routes, part of the generated  international traffic that would not occur unless 
investments had explicit cross-border implications should be estimated and translated into 
cross-border benefits. As an extension, wider impacts on trade, investment, and tourism 
should be identified and quantified to the extent practical. 
4.2.3  Need for Inter-Modal Analysis 
Due to limited geographical advantages, some transport corridor routes such as the 
Southern Economic Corridor in GMS might face competition with sea transport. Even when 
the physical and non-physical bottlenecks are eliminated, the advantage of the land 
transport along this corridor may be limited unless flows of traffic between Bangkok and 
HCMC become very smooth and time savings become significant. While short-distance 
journeys along the road corridor will maintain their competitive advantage, long-haul 
journeys will face competition with alternative transport modes. Long-term projection of 
agglomeration and dispersion effects along economic corridors should account for the 
alternative routes  and, if necessary, consider the most efficient inter-modal transport 
systems for private businesses to follow up with complementary investments. 
4.3  .Baseline Survey and Benchmarking of Outputs, Outcomes, 
and Impacts 
Resource constraints often make baseline data unavailable for post evaluation. Baseline 
indicators are often at best collected by supervision consultants at the beginning of project 
implementation. This can cause a serious problem later because the government executing 
agency often lacks the capacity or incentive to monitor the progress on the indicators. For 
example, as virtually no baseline data were available in the Lao PDR during the elaboration 
of the environmental impact evaluation for the Theun-Hinbon Hydropower Project, much of 
the environmental investigation was left to local personnel with limited experience. 
It is often impossible to measure project impacts in a regional perspective. Sometimes 
separate project completion analyses are done instead of one coherent analysis of national- 
and  regional-level impacts (e.g., Phnom Penh–HCMC Highway Project). The problem 
usually goes back to inadequate identification of measurable indicators and collection of 
baseline data. While benchmarking of impacts (e.g., traffic and trade) may be difficult for new 
road projects, it is easier for road rehabilitation and upgrading projects. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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4.4  Impact Monitoring and Risk Management 
4.4.1  Measurable and Quantifiable Performance Indicators for Cross-Border Effects 
Performance targets in the design and monitoring framework for cross-border projects 
should be easily measurable and quantifiable to be compatible with the resource and 
capacity constraints of the executing and implementing agencies. For example, the CAREC 
Regional Road Corridor Improvement Project offers some good examples. Impact indicators 
are bilateral trade volume by origin and destination, and outcome indicators are daily 
international freight traffic; traffic accidents on the corridor; travel time between border 
points; number of children in the project area attending secondary school; and agricultural, 
horticultural, and livestock production in the project area. 
4.4.2  More Care Required in Monitoring of Negative Externalities 
Negative socioeconomic impacts often do not receive adequate attention at the time of 
project design and implementation. Project administrators often react to what happens on 
the ground rather than take preemptive actions. For example, in response to the perceived 
higher risk of HIV/AIDS at road construction sites and the neighbor communities, they 
mobilize nongovernmental organizations and women’s groups to monitor and mitigate the 
impact. FDI projects attracted by cross-border road projects might deprive people in the host 
country of sources of their livelihood, such as forest resources (the Lao PDR is one such 
case). Cross-border road projects also run the risk of a large influx of migrant laborers from 
neighbor countries that might settle permanently and cause social friction. Preventive and 
mitigation measures against these risks need to be considered well in advance. 
Hydropower projects involve unique risks. Trans-basin projects such as the Theun-Hinboun 
Hydropower Project, even when quasi-run-of-river in design and operation, can have 
significant environmental and social impacts. Their implementation should not proceed 
without developing adequate baseline data and designing a comprehensive mitigation plan. 
Sufficient time and staff should be allocated for this purpose. In order to mitigate resource 
constraints on the part of the developing countries, donors could provide funds for 
environmental and social mitigation after plant operation and to specify clear and 
measurable performance indicators. 
Lessons drawn from the evaluation of power projects during preparation of the Nam Theun 2 
Hydroelectric Project included the following:  
(i)  Early comprehensive assessment of economic and social impacts is 
necessary; 
(ii)  Baseline data needs to be established; 
(iii)  Downstream impacts of trans-basin projects are often underestimated; 
(iv)  Livelihood restoration should be emphasized more; 
(v)  A comprehensive monitoring mechanism is needed during implementation and 
operations; 
(vi)  Sufficient funds are needed for environmental and social mitigation; and 
(vii)  Strengthened capacity is needed to implement and monitor the project 
effectively. 
4.4.3  Crowding Out of Informal Businesses by Cross-Border Transport 
Infrastructure 
As evidenced in Singh and Mitra (2006), there seems to be a trade-off between formal and 
informal trade. Owing to the nature of formal trade, which makes it easier to sustain larger 
and more formal enterprises, the smaller border traders are at risk of being crowded out. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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Bigger foreign retailers come into the border markets to sell their brands directly, 
outperforming petty traders. Similarly, increasing formalization of cross-border trucks not 
having to transship freight at borders would allow large logistics companies to crowd out 
petty transport operators such as cart pushers and loading and unloading laborers who 
generally belong o the poorer economic strata. While this may be  somewhat inevitable, 
associated risks and possible mitigation measures might be considered. 
4.5  Policy and Institutional Challenges 
4.5.1  Need for Complementary Policy Development in Border-Crossing Procedures 
When physical construction of cross-border infrastructure is completed, institutional and 
regulatory aspects involved in moving goods and people across borders become the largest 
constraint to fully realizing cross-border externalities. The effectiveness of a given corridor 
for private sector businesses depends on the cost of crossing borders. For example, 
Banomyong’s (2007) analysis indicates that as much as 60% of the total transport cost 
between Bangkok and Kunming in 2006 was related to two border-crossing and transit fees. 
4.5.2  Need for Flexibility in Preparation and Implementation 
Even a small conflict between participating governments, for instance over the location of 
border demarcation, can cause an incomplete connectivity and reduced impact, as was the 
case in the Champasak Road Improvement Project. In the case of the Almaty–Bishkek 
Regional Road Rehabilitation Project, making effective bilateral cross-border transport 
agreements a prerequisite for investments temporarily stalled project advancement. In the 
case of GMS, while the Cross-Border Transport Agreement has been signed by all member 
governments (which took nine years), its smooth implementation faces political resistance 
by some parties and often inter-agency rivalry among the transport ministry, agricultural 
ministry, customs office, immigration office, and security authority. While institutions and 
regulatory aspects are necessary complements to physical construction of roads, issues 
involved in cross-border movement of goods and people can be complex and politically 
sensitive. A flexible approach is advised. 
4.5.3  Role of Regional Agency in Mitigating Investment Risks and Avoiding Unfair 
Contracts 
Even when power projects can be wholly funded by private sector investors and financiers, 
regional agencies like ADB play a critical role in mitigating perceived risks by supporting 
regulatory reforms as well as ensuring fair purchase contracts among the stakeholders. 
In the case of the Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project, a power purchase agreement was 
signed with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand in 1996 guaranteeing an offtake 
of 95% of THPC estimated to average 1.645 gigawatt hours per annum. But the power 
purchase agreement proved to have both positive and negative features for THPC. While the 
quantity of electricity sold was guaranteed, the sales revenue depended on two key factors: 
(i) annual tariff increase of only 1% in nominal terms implied a decrease in real terms if the 
United States inflation rate was higher and (ii) the Asian financial crisis had drawn attention 
to fluctuations in exchange rates. Donor agencies like ADB should, if requested, provide 
assistance in drafting and negotiating power purchase agreements. 
In the case of the Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project, with support from the World Bank and 
ADB, the Lao PDR government has formulated a public expenditure management 
strengthening program in order to enhance efficiency and transparency. Previously, 
dividends from government investments in the power sector have remained with Electricite 
du Laos to subsidize electricity tariffs instead of supporting poverty reduction programs. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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4.5.4  Entangled Political Issues May Stall Projects 
Even with good rationale and analysis of cross-border benefits, a regional project may be 
stalled by context-specific political problems. This was the case with the Regional Power 
Transmission Modernization Project between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which was 
canceled after a few years of preparation because the power purchase agreement was not 
signed. Issues that may not be specific to the project could complicate consensus making. 
Commercial arrangements between governments are often dictated more by political than 
economic considerations. In contrast, in the case of the Regional Power Transmission 
Project between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, the signing of the power trade agreement did 
not face much political complexity because Afghanistan does not share the problems 
specific to the Former Soviet Union and is heavily supported by donor assistance in 
institutions and regulatory aspects as well. This underscores the importance of putting 
project analysis in a proper institutional and political economy context and sequencing 
appropriate forms of interventions in stages. 
5.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Major recommendations drawn from our review and lessons learned include the following: 
(i)  Rationale as a cross-border project should be articulated during project 
preparation. This is important when the financing requirement for the project is 
large. An explicitly regional perspective could help in mobilizing funds from a 
wider circle of donors. 
(ii)  More time and resources should be allocated to distribution analysis in order to 
clarify the project rationale and mitigate coordination failure, as well as to help 
mobilize funds. In particular, regional benefits beyond the sum of domestic 
benefits should be identified and estimated to the extent possible. For projects 
in the transport sector, the analysis done for the CAREC Regional Road 
Corridor Improvement Project seems to be a good start (see Table 3 for an 
illustration). For projects in the energy sector, the analysis done for the Nam 
Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project seems to be a good start (see Table 4 for an 
illustration). Even when a project is located within a single country, showing 
additional cross-border benefits accruing to neighbor countries would enhance 
inter-country cooperation and promote better alignment of national and regional 
development goals. A properly prepared distribution analysis can help adjust 
project design for a win-win outcome. Detailed distribution analysis by 
disaggregated stakeholders across is desired, as illustrated in Appendix 4. 
(iii)  Completing different sections of a transport corridor in a timely manner is 
important in assuring maximum developmental impact. When different donors 
are involved in assisting construction of a transport corridor, careful 
coordination is required. The number of donors involved and associated 
uncertainties should be minimized. When recipient governments’ capacities for 
coordination are weak, donors might together co-finance sector-wide technical 
assistance for capacity building. 
(iv)  In the energy and ICT sectors, regional development agencies such as ADB 
should focus more on their role as an “honest coordinator” in preparation of 
cross-border projects as they have a fair chance of public–partnership in 
financing. 
(v)  Where political tensions tend to stall inter-country cooperation in preparing 
cross-border infrastructure projects, regional development agencies such as 
ADB should play an “honest mediator” role based on the historical background 
of the parties involved.  ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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(vi)  To the extent possible, measurable indicators for evaluating cross-border 
benefits should be identified in the project preparation stage and monitored 
throughout the project cycle. For example, transport projects should collect the 
following categories of baseline information: (i) traffic count by vehicle type, 
origin, and destination; (ii) freight movements by type of freight, origin, and 
destination (through a survey of freight forwarders); and (iii) trade impact (by 
gathering time series customs data on major commodities being moved along 
corridors). In order to mitigate resource constraints on the part of developing 
countries, donors could attach to project support piggy-backed technical 
assistance specific to evaluation purposes for selected projects aiming at 
collecting baseline data and monitoring critical cross-border impact indicators. 
For positive externalities, such indicators could include trade and investment as 
well as household income along the economic corridors. For negative 
externalities, indicators could include incidence of infectious diseases, human 
trafficking, and forest areas cleared. 
(vii)  In complementing physical construction of transport corridors, the necessary 
regulatory aspects of cross-border trade, especially transit trade, should be put 
in place as early as possible. For example, a region-wide standard similar to 
the Transport International Routier Convention should be put in place along 
with cross-border transport agreements, as suggested by Banomyong (2007). 
(viii)  Preventive and mitigation measures should be prepared against some of the 
easily predictable and potentially large negative impacts of cross-border 
transport projects. For example, the Dushanbe–Kyrgyz Border Road 
Rehabilitation (Phase II) Project includes a grant-financed component on 
HIV/AIDS and migration to support Tajikistan’s Ministry of Health’s National 
HIV/AIDS Center in developing an integrated, community-based, gender-
responsive approach to HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases. The 
Mongolia Regional Road Development Project includes technical assistance for 
awareness and prevention of HIV/AIDS and human trafficking on the North–
South Road Corridor in the CAREC program. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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—  = no data available. 
ADB = Asian Development Bank; PRC = People’s Republic of China; VOC = vehicle operating cost. 
a  This illustration derives from a road project located across Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic and connecting with the PRC and Afghanistan. The numbers in the 
table are illustrative and do not necessarily reflect real situations. 
b  Discount rate of ADB-standard 12% is used. Economic costs are indicated by a negative sign. Details on the conversion from financial to economic (shadow) 
prices are omitted in this table. 
c  These benefits are assumed to accrue to agricultural households in Tajikistan. 
d  Based on VOC saving associated with existing level of traffic. 
e  Based on VOC saving associated with generated domestic traffic in Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic. 
f  Based on VOC saving associated with generated cross-country traffic based on analysis of trade patterns in the region: specifically, Tajikistan–Kyrgyz trade, 
Tajikistan–PRC trade, Afghanistan–PRC trade, and vehicle imports from PRC. 
g  This benefit derives from the concessional terms of the loans provided by ADB relative to the terms available in the private capital market. 
h  A laborer’s benefit derives from the difference between the project payment and the worker’s opportunity cost. 
i  “Economy” represents the rest of the economy, composed of those who are not identified as key stakeholders, lumped together with government as tax 
revenues and expenditures accrue eventually to the general public. 
Source: Modified from ADB (2007). ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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c   863.1  —  —  215.8  —  129.5  215.8  302.1 
Consumer surplus
d  185.1  6.4  —  —  178.6  —  —  — 
Construction cost
e  –750.7  —  10.2  –681.3  —  —  –79.6  — 
Maintenance cost  –65.8  —  —  –65.8  —  —  —  — 
Concessional finance
f  702.9  —  —  702.9  —  —  —  — 











Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
a  This illustration derives from a power project in which Lao PDR transmits and sells electricity to Thailand across the Mekong River. The numbers in the table 
are illustrative and do not necessarily reflect real situations. 
b  Discount rate of ADB-standard 12% is used. Economic costs are indicated by a negative sign. Details on the conversion from financial to economic (shadow) 
prices are omitted in this table. 
c  Based on incremental demand. Sales revenue is assumed to be distributed in proportion to equity contributions to the operating company (Nam Theun 2 
Power Company): Lao PDR government, Thai private investor, Thai public power company, and external investors. 
d  Based on non-incremental demand for replacing existing energy supply and incremental demand.  
e  Includes construction of transmission line borne by Thai government. 
f  Concessional finance is provided by a consortium of development agencies and commercial lenders. 
g  A laborer’s benefit derives from the difference between the project payment and the worker’s opportunity cost. 
h  “Economy” represents the rest of the economy, composed of those who are not identified as key stakeholders, lumped together with government as tax 
revenues and expenditures accrue eventually to the general public. 
Source: Modified from ADB (2005). 
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APPENDIX 1: AGGREGATION TECHNOLOGY FOR 
REGIONAL PUBLIC GOODS 
Understanding supply characteristics of regional public goods (RPGs) can be helpful in 
determining the case for public intervention at the regional level and the appropriate form of 
financing. Sandler (2004) provides a useful framework in this regard (see Table A.1.1). The 
“aggregation technology” reflects divisibility and appropriability of the services deriving from 
the RPGs, which in turn determines individual members’ free-riding incentives, which then 
determines the level of coordination failure in RPG provision.  
 
Table A.1.1: Regional Public Goods: Typology and Examples 
Aggregate Level of 





Club Good  Joint Products 
Summation: sum of  
countries’ contributions 







Weighted sum: differentially 






Power grid  Eliminating 
transnational 
terrorist threat 











Prevention and  
mitigation of  
natural disasters 
Weaker link: smallest  
contribution, followed by  
the second smallest  
contribution, and so on 
Forestalling spread 
of 








Best shot: largest  
contribution 







Better shot: largest  
contribution, followed by 
the second largest  











Source: Sandler (2004: 21, Table 1.1). 
In terms of the conventional characterization of public goods (the columns in Table A.1.1)—
non-rivalry of benefits and excludability of non-payers—almost all cross-border infrastructure 
projects would fall within the club good category (Internet connectivity is categorized as a 
“joint product” in that it provides network externality as well as commercial user-specific 
benefits of a club nature). In principle, club goods can be efficiently provided through 
appropriate user charges such as differential tolls based on revealed road use, but equity 
concerns remain. For example, smaller members with less financial and institutional capacity 
might require cross-subsidization within the club or subsidy by external donors. 
In terms of the supply characteristics (the rows in Table A.1.1), however, there exist 
differences in the optimal way of intervention by regional development institutions such as 
ADB. For example, a power grid falls within the weighted sum technology in which the 
overall level of regional power service is determined by a differentially weighted sum of the 
countries’ contributions. National governments or private sector players would have an 
incentive to finance such infrastructure in “higher-weight” portions of the grid (e.g., 
topographically easier to build; large power surplus-deficit gap across borders) while “lower-
weight” portions might require financing by external donors. Furthermore, the technical 
nature of power grids requires that all portions of the network adopt the same standards and ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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regulations for maximizing its services. External donors have a role in coordinating this 
aspect as well as supporting capacity building for institutionally weak members, preventing 
potentially unfair contracts and pricing between the countries exporting and importing the 
power, and assisting in dispute resolution. 
Transport infrastructure projects would fall within either the weakest link technology, in which 
the smallest contribution fixes the effective aggregate supply level for the entire region, or 
the weaker link, in which smaller contributions determine the aggregate level. An example of 
the weakest link would be the least well-functioning transport infrastructure (or missing link) 
that may determine the reliability of the whole regional transport system (e.g.,  the 
Cambodian portion of the Pan-Asia Railway connecting Singapore to Beijing). An example of 
the weaker link would be portions of road networks that are located in landlocked countries 
(Lao PDR, Bhutan, Nepal, Central Asian republics). It seems that private sector players had 
inadequate incentive to finance transport infrastructure in these portions precisely because 
they are the weaker or weakest link, partly due to difficult geographical conditions and partly 
due to inadequate capacity of the governments. Therefore, these links have a strong case 
for public support by external donors in financing the physical infrastructure and associated 
institutional and regulatory arrangements, such as cross-border trade agreements, as well 
as capacity building of the institutionally weak members. 
In addition to capacity building support for weak members, donor support to repeated 
interactions among club members also helps alleviate coordination failure. Bringing 
government officials together on a regular basis, while it would consume resources without 
concrete results in the beginning, would allow members to learn one another’s preferences 
and concerns, thus reducing asymmetric information, as pointed out in Sandler (2004). ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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APPENDIX 2: DYNAMICS OF AGGLOMERATION AND 
DISPERSION 
Two opposing economic forces work in the formation of economic nodes across borders 
with development of cross-border infrastructure. Table A.2.1 provides examples of such 
opposing forces. Initially, as centripetal forces dominate centrifugal forces, a few large 
economic nodes will be formed along regional transport corridors, leading to widening 
disparity. Then, as centrifugal forces dominate centripetal forces over time, economic 
activities will disperse and more small and medium-sized nodes will be formed, leading to 
shrinking disparity. 
Table A.2.1: Causes of Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces 
Centripetal Forces across Borders  Centrifugal Forces across Borders 
-  Increasing returns in production 
-  Pecuniary externalities through     
backward and forward linkages 
-  Network externalities in consumption 
-  Knowledge spillovers and other  
positive externalities 
-  Immobile factors (land and, in some 
cases, labor) 
-  Rise in factor prices/commuting cost 
-  Congestion/pollution and other  
negative externalities 
Source: Adapted from Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999: 346). 
Figure A.2.1 illustrates such dynamics. Connectivity cost here broadly refers to all costs 
involved in private sector entities (e.g., manufacturers, traders, forwarders, tour operators) in 
linking their businesses across borders toward becoming seamless. It covers costs including 
transport costs, waiting time at borders, tariffs, customs procedures, and necessary 
telecommunications. In the new economic geography literature, these are often collectively 
referred to as “service link cost,” a concept similar to “transaction costs” used in 
microeconomics. It is conceivable that as the connectivity cost decreases over time, initially 
diverse economies in developmental stages and resource endowments will form the kind of 
sequential positive externalities that first go to a few of the existing nodes disproportionately, 
and then subsequently go to a large number of new nodes , leading to a win-win long-run 
outcome. This line of scenario can be simulated using a “geographical equilibrium” model. 
For example, a simulation by ERIA (2008) yielded a preliminary result in which, holding 
macroeconomic and demographic characteristics constant, improvement in transport speed 
and time along the East–West Corridor, for example, leads eventually to dispersion of 
population and economic value added along the route between Bangkok and Hanoi. 
While this scenario is plausible in generally illustrating how cross-border infrastructure 
projects impact the participating economies, the benefit-cost distribution “profile” over time 
(in the lower half of Figure A.2.1) is influenced by complementary investments. For example, 
transit countries along economic corridors are well positioned to accelerate the centrifugal 
force for dispersion (i.e., condensing the curve horizontally in the upper half of Figure A.2.1) 
by setting up facilities such as special economic zones, industrial estates, and distribution 
centers in order to attract intra- and extra-regional foreign direct investment inflows. Various 
donors could join in providing analytical and financial assistance in this regard. Doing so 
would contribute to a successful formulation of cross-border infrastructure projects and their 
sustainability.  
In fact, the concept of economic corridor borrows from the regional growth triangle paradigm. 
This paradigm refers to economic zones spread over relatively large but well-defined, 
geographically adjacent areas in which differences in the factor endowments of three or 
more countries are exploited so as to promote growth, external trade, and direct investment. 
An economic corridor consists of several elements: a defined location; economic activities, 
physical infrastructure including an economic and transport system around which economic ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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activities can be clustered, and soft infrastructure (including foreign investment regulations, 
incentives, and institutions) (ADB 1999). Therefore, it is necessary to anticipate these 
elements in planning cross-border infrastructure investments, and their development should 
be monitored and evaluated. 
As transport costs decline, immediate supply responses are mostly domestic, such as new 
service establishments along the road. In order to achieve broad development impact such 
as increased cross-border trade and foreign direct investment, complementary interventions 
are needed such as special economic zones, investment incentives, and simplification and 
harmonization of border-crossing procedures. 
Figure A.2.1: Dynamics of Agglomeration and Dispersion due to Cross-Border 
Infrastructure Development 
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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF THE PROJECTS REVIEWED 
Project Name  
(Borrower Country) 
Loan Approval  Project Completion  ADB’s Post 
Evaluation 
GMS 
1. Champasak Road Improvement (LAO)  Aug 1995  Oct 2001  Nov 05 
2. Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City Highway Improvement 
(CAM/VIE) 
Dec 1998  Dec 2005  Ongoing 
3. Southern Yunnan Road Development (PRC)  May 1999  est. 2008   
4. East–West Corridor (LAO/VIE)  Nov 1999  Mar 2007  Ongoing 
5. Northern Economic Corridor (LAO)  Dec 2002  Mar 2008   
6. Cambodia Road Improvement (CAM)  Nov 2002  est. Dec 2006   
7. Rehabilitation of the Railway in Cambodia (CAM)  Nov 2006  est. Dec 2009   
8. Kunming–Haiphong Transport Corridor: Yen Vien–Lao Cai 
Railway Upgrading (VIE) 
Nov 2006  est. Jun 2012   
9. Kunming–Haiphong Transport Corridor: Noi Bai–Lao Cai 
Highway (VIE) 
Nov 2007  est. Jun 2012   
10. Northern GMS Transport Network Improvement (LAO)  Sep 2007  est. Dec 2013   
11. GMS Southern Coastal Corridor (CAM/VIE)  Nov 2007  est. Dec 2014   
12. Theun-Hinboun Hydropower (LAO)  Nov 1994   Dec 2000   
13. Nam Leuk Hydropower (LAO)  Jul 1996  Feb 2002  Dec 2004 
14. GMS Transmission (CAM)  Nov 2003  est. Jun 2008   
15. Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric (LAO)  Mar 2005  est. Nov 2009   
16. Second Power Transmission and Distribution (CAM)  Sep 2006  est. Dec 2010   
CAREC 
17. Almaty–Bishkek Regional Road Rehabilitation (KAZ/KGZ)  Oct 2000  Dec 2006  Planned 
18. Dushanbe–Kyrgyz Border Road Rehabilitation (Phase I) (TAJ)  Dec 2003  est. Dec 2007   
19. Dushanbe–Kyrgyz Border Road Rehabilitation (Phase II) (TAJ)  Oct 2005  est. Jun 2009   
20. Regional Road Development (MON)  Jul 2004  est. Jul 2009   
21. East–West Highway Improvement (AZE)  Nov 2005  est. Nov 2009   
22. CAREC Regional Road Corridor Improvement (KGZ/TAJ)  Oct 2007  est. Mar 2013   
23. Regional Power Transmission Modernization (TAJ/UZB)   Nov 2002  est. Dec 2007   
24. Regional Power Transmission Interconnection (AFG/TAJ)  Nov 2006  est. Jun 2010   
SASEC 
25. SASEC Information Highway (BAN/BHU/IND/NEP)  Nov 2007  est. Dec 2009   
Pacific 
26. Establishment of Pacific Aviation Safety Office  Sep 2005  est. Oct 2010   
AFG = Afghanistan; AZE = Azerbaijan; BAN = Bangladesh; BHU = Bhutan; CAM = Cambodia; CAREC = Central 
Asian Regional Cooperation; GMS = Greater Mekong Subregion; IND = India; KAZ = Kazakhstan; KGZ = Kyrgyz 
Republic; LAO = Lao PDR; MON = Mongolia; NEP = Nepal; PRC = People’s Republic of China; SASEC = South Asia 
Subregional Economic Cooperation; TAJ = Tajikistan; UZB = Uzbekistan; VIE = Viet Nam. 
Note: The dates in this table are indicative, as there are often difficulties in determining the dates for project 
completion. For example, financial and technical closing can diverge from physical completion of construction 
activities. Also, project completion reports go through internal review, editing, and approval at ADB. 
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APPENDIX 4: USE OF IMPACT DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS: 
AN ILLUSTRATION WITH THE NORTHERN ECONOMIC 
CORRIDOR PROJECT 
The Northern Economic Corridor Project  constructed an all-weather road covering 228 
kilometers  in two provinces of the northwestern Lao PDR  from the Thai border town of 
Houayxai to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) border town of Boten. With the expected 
bridge construction over the Mekong River (to be completed by 2011), this road completes 
the Bangkok–Kunming North–South Economic Corridor in the Greater Mekong Subregion 
program. In the project appraisal carried out in 2002, the project’s economic benefits were 
calculated based on the direct savings in estimated vehicle operating costs (VOC) 
associated with normal (or existing) traffic, generated traffic, and diverted traffic (from the 
river). The appraisal did not attempt to quantify indirect benefits through induced trade, 
investments, and new employment opportunities. The project costs considered consisted of 
civil works, project management and supervision, resettlement costs, environmental 
management plans, administrative costs,  and recurring maintenance costs. Valuation of 
benefits and costs was based on an anticipated project life of 30 years and an ADB-standard 
rate of 12% was used to discount them to the present values in 2002 prices. The appraisal 
assumed workers for the road construction would be drawn from the project area and that 
the opportunity cost of labor for the project workers was equal to the prevailing local market 
wage rate (i.e., that there was no surplus labor in the project area). Therefore, there were no 
net direct benefits to laborers working on the project. Table A.4.1 illustrates the benefit-cost 
distribution based on these assumptions.  
While the analysis indicates an overall positive outcome of the project, a disproportionate 
share of the benefits from saved VOC, particularly associated  with diverted traffic, were 
projected to accrue to Thai and PRC stakeholders. This follows from the fact that the road 
would improve the transport link between these two larger economies and the majority of the 
diverted traffic on the road was expected to involve stakeholders based in the PRC and 
Thailand.  However,  two compensation mechanisms assumed in the project arrangement 
make up for the otherwise unfavorable distributional outcome for the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR). The first is the transit fee to be collected by the Lao PDR 
government from the road users including those originating from Thailand and the PRC. The 
second is the concessional loans (net financial transfer due to the favorable terms of 
government loans compared with commercial loans)  provided by the  Thai and PRC 
governments to the Lao PDR government (captured in the “Finance” row in the table). These 
arrangements would counter potential unfavorable social and environmental effects that 
would mainly accrue to stakeholders in the Lao PDR and help ensure a win-win outcome of 
the investment in the project road. 
In addition to direct impacts on VOC and project investment costs, attempts should be made 
to capture wider impacts through changes in trade, investment, and tourist flows, as well as 
anticipated social and environmental effects. While not all of these effects are quantifiable, 
they could be more substantial than what the conventional analysis could capture. Table 
A.4.1 illustrates the ranges of effects that could be covered. Conventional analysis captures 
mainly direct effects in the first four rows: concessional finance, construction and operation 
and maintenance, changes in traffic, and saved transport cost. The rest of the effects are of 
an indirect and long-run nature. Depending on data availability (e.g., time-series local 
customs data, disaggregated household survey data) and feasibility of stakeholder 
interviews, some of these effects could be analyzed and projected in a coherent way, e.g., 
using models for regional markets of representative traded goods that are transported 
increasingly due to the project. ADBI Working Paper 226    Fujimura and Adhikari 
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a                                         
— 
   
Normal   
traffic  40.10  6.66  9.05  6.23  13.26  0.95  0.78  1.42  0.97  0.78 
Generated 
traffic   12.21  6.64  0.87  2.21  0.59  0.18  0.40  0.63  0.21  0.48 
Diverted 
traffic  33.92  —  —  —  4.04  7.10  5.82  4.04  7.10  5.82 
Transit fee  30.2  —  —  —  30.2  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Construction 
costs   
—  —  — 
 
—  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
 Labor  –7.3  –7.3 
 Equipment  –20.8  –20.8 
 Material  –13.5  –13.5 
 Other  –10.4  –10.4 
 O&M  –7.6  –7.6 
Finance 
d  0  —  —  —  34.6  —  —  —  –17.3  —  —  —  –17.3 
Net benefits  56.83  13.30  9.92  —  13.64  17.89  8.23  —  –10.3  6.09  8.28  —  –10.2 
By country  56.83  36.86  15.82  4.15 
(Share %)  (100)  (64.9)  (27.8)  (7.3) 
ADB = Asian Development Bank; Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic; O&M = operations and 
maintenance; PRC = People’s Republic of China; VOC = vehicle operation cost. 
a  Savings on vehicle operation cost are estimated based on projected traffic growth and the operating costs by 
vehicle type (various sizes of buses and trucks). 
b  To the extent that the project labor is drawn from “surplus” labor whose opportunity cost is lower than the paid 
wage rate, the project labor would have positive benefits. In this particular case, it was assumed that there 
exists no surplus labor. 
c  This can be considered the residual stakeholders who cannot be particularly identified. It is considered here that 
the benefits and costs accruing to the government are eventually borne by taxpayers or the rest of the economy. 
d  Without the knowledge of the loan terms, it is assumed that Thailand and the PRC share an equal amount of 
financial transfer. ADB also provides a concessional loan to the Lao PDR government but ADB’s net benefit is 
not included in the table as it would not count toward economic criteria for the project decision. 
Source: Modified from ADB (2003: 4–66) 
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Table A.4.2: Stakeholder Impact Distribution Analysis: An Illustration with the Northern Economic Corridor Project 
Channel of effects  Lao PDR  Thailand  PRC 
Stakeholders  Impacts  Stakeholders  Impacts  Stakeholders  Impacts 
Concessional 
finance 




Lao PDR government  Construction and O&M cost         
Workers in Bokeo and 
Louang Namtha provinces 
Income gain   Engineers and workers in 
Chiang Rai Province 
Income gain  Engineers and workers in 
Yunnan Province 
Income gain 
Changes in traffic  Truck/bus operators  Income gain  Truck/bus operators  Income gain  Truck/bus operators  Income gain 
Boat operators   Income loss  Boat operators   Income loss  Ship operators   Income loss 





Income gain  Passengers / freight 
forwarders  







Farmers, coal mine workers  Export to Thailand: lignite coal, 
wood products, corn, livestock  
Firms in industries, 
workers 
Export to Lao PDR: fuel, 
construction materials 
Farmers, firms in industries, 
workers 
Export to Lao PDR: agricultural tools, 
electrical appliances, fruit and 
vegetables 
Farmers   Export to the PRC: wood 
products, rubber, corn 
Firms in industries, 
workers 
Export to the PRC: 
processed food, fuel 
Farmers, firms in industries, 
workers 
Export to Thailand: fresh fruit, lighters, 
electronic products 
Consumers along the road  Gain from cheaper imports  Consumers in Chiang Rai 
Province 
Gain from cheaper imports  Consumers in Yunnan 
Province 
Gain from cheaper imports 





Income gain  Tour operators, 
hotels/guesthouses 
Income gain  Tour operators, 
hotels/guesthouses 
Income gain 
Some in Houayxai  Loss due to shorter stay  Some in Chiang Khong  Loss due to shorter stay     
Induced 
investments 
Lao PDR domestic investors  Sand and gravel mining, salt 
factory, crushing stone, sawmills 
Investors in Lao PDR  Sawmills, lignite mining, 
corn 
Investors in Lao PDR  Mining, livestock, motorcycle 
assembly, rubber plantation 
        Investors in Thailand  Industrial park in Chiang Rai 
Better access to 
services 
Residents in Bokeo and 
Louang Namtha provinces 
Easier access to health, 
education, and labor market 
       
Social impacts  Residents along the road   Resettlement, accidents, 
communicable diseases 
Residents near the road  Communicable diseases  Residents near the road  Communicable diseases 
Local government  Health sector burden  Local government  Health sector burden  Local government  Health sector burden 
Environmental 
impacts 
Residents along the road  Land use change, loss of 
biodiversity 
       
Aesthetic impact  Residents along the road  Trash         
Construction 
impact 
Residents along the road  Soil erosion, water 
contamination, dust 
       
  Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic; O&M = operation and maintenance; PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
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